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A B S T R A C T
This paper posits that the combination of changes in a forerunner's industry legitimacy and a latecomer's efforts
to endogenise windows of opportunity allows the latecomer to evolve from a turnkey importer to a global
exporter. Our theoretical assertions are supported by analysing Korea as a latecomer in the nuclear power
industry. We show that both an increase and a decrease in a forerunner's industry legitimacy provides exogenous
windows of opportunity for the latecomer to access a forerunner's knowledge base. In particular, the decrease in
a forerunner's industry legitimacy provides a critical opportunity for the latecomer to acquire core technology. In
addition, our analysis shows some interesting findings on the latecomer's endogenisation of windows of op-
portunity through the lens of technological innovation systems. This study advances a more fine-grained view on
catch-up theory by shedding new light on the implications of transnational industry legitimacy dynamics and
windows of opportunity for a latecomer's catch-up in complex product systems.
1. Introduction
Complex product systems (CoPS) are considered socio-technical
systems (Geels, 2004, 2006; Gil et al., 2012; Walker, 2000) that are the
deliverables of very costly and technology-intensive mega-projects
(Hobday et al., 2005). Because of the technological complexity of CoPS
and high entry barriers set by incumbents (Davies and Brady, 2000;
Park, 2012), it is challenging for latecomers to enter a CoPS industry.
Despite the challenges, disruptive changes in a forerunner's industry
legitimacy that cause industrial crisis can create exogenous windows of
opportunity for latecomers to acquire and absorb technologies released
by the forerunners (Mathews, 2005; Lee and Mathews, 2012; Lee and
Malerba, 2017). Surprisingly, however, prior studies on CoPS have not
paid sufficient attention to the implications of transnational legitimacy
dynamics such as an exogenous window for latecomers to catch up.
In addition to exogenous windows of opportunity derived from the
changes in forerunners’ industry legitimacy to which latecomers can
merely or passively ‘respond’ in a transnational context (Yap and
Truffer, 2019), we also investigate how latecomers in a domestic con-
text actively endogenise windows of opportunity by considering the six
core functions of technological innovation systems (TIS) for successful
industry formation and catch-up (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). The
functions are knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimenta-
tion, guidance of a search, legitimation, market formation, and resource
mobilisation (Bergek et al., 2008; Binz et al., 2014; Hekkert et al.,
2007). Our approach for distinguishing between exogenous and en-
dogenous windows of opportunity is meaningful, as the extant litera-
ture has treated windows of opportunity as exogenous to the actors in
latecomer countries (Yap and Truffer, 2019).
Given these issues, this study posits that the combination of changes
in a forerunner's industry legitimacy and a latecomer's efforts to en-
dogenise windows of opportunity drives the latecomer's catch-up.
Accordingly, our framework first argues that the changes in fore-
runners’ industry legitimacy create exogenous windows of opportunity
(Perez and Soete, 1988) for latecomers by drawing on catch-up theory
(Lee and Lim, 2001; Lee and Malerba, 2017) and legitimacy theory
(Suchman, 1995). Second, it theorises how latecomers endogenise
windows of opportunity for catching up in CoPS by referring to the six
core functions of TIS (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Yap and
Truffer, 2019). Our theoretical assertions are examined by combining
longitudinal quantitative data and qualitative accounts derived from
archival search and interviews to analyse the catch-up in (South) Kor-
ea's nuclear power industry. We focus on Korea, as it is the only late-
comer in the global nuclear power industry to achieve the status of a
global exporter and is the sixth country to export its technology (after
the US, Russia, Canada, France, and Japan) (Hindmarsh and
Priestley, 2015).
This study makes some important contributions. First, it enhances
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our understanding of the emergence of exogenous windows of oppor-
tunity by investigating the legitimacy dynamics in a CoPS industry from
a transnational perspective (Binz and Truffer, 2017). Second, com-
bining insights from catch-up theory (Lee and Malerba, 2017) and the
TIS framework (Bergek et al., 2008; Binz et al., 2016; Hekkert et al.,
2007; Yap and Truffer, 2019), we contribute to prior research by dis-
tinguishing between exogenous and endogenous windows of opportu-
nity to explain the determinants of latecomers’ catch-up in a CoPS.
Collectively, these contributions enable us to develop a deeper under-
standing of the trajectories from a latecomer's inception to the stage
(see Miao et al., 2018, p. 665) when the latecomer becomes an in-
digenous developer that can export a turnkey CoPS.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 begins
with the theoretical background by reviewing the streams of literature
on CoPS and latecomers’ catch-up. Subsequently, a theoretical frame-
work is proposed in Section 3, which is used to analyse the case.
Section 4 explains the research context, analytical approach, data, and
methods used in the analysis. Section 5 conducts a longitudinal analysis
of South Korea's nuclear power industry. Section 6 discusses our theo-
retical contributions as well as relevant policy and managerial im-
plications.
2. Latecomer's CoPS and windows of opportunity
Latecomer or less-developed countries acknowledge the importance
of CoPS and try to enter into an industry, because it enables their
modern industrial and economic progress through technological accu-
mulation and spillover of CoPS across various industries (Hobday et al.,
2005). Recent studies on latecomers’ CoPS in telecommunication sys-
tems (Park, 2012), aircraft (Naghizadeh et al., 2017; Vértesy, 2017),
and electricity generation systems (Kiamehr et al., 2013;
Safdari Ranjbar, Park, Ghazinoori, and Manteghi, 2019) mainly address
how latecomers develop technological capabilities to catch up with
market leaders. Park (2012) and Naghizadeh et al. (2017) highlighted
the capabilities related to networking, integrative knowledge and skills,
and policy-making. Kiamehr et al. (2013) suggested the strategic,
functional, and project system integration capabilities needed. These
capabilities focused on the importance of mobilising various resources
and technologies for system integrators (Davies and Brady, 2000;
Davies and Hobday, 2005).
In addition, prior studies on a latecomer's CoPS commonly empha-
sise that government initiative is essential in the absence of private
actors that can take on projects that are as capital and technology in-
tensive as CoPS (Vértesy, 2017; Lee and Ki, 2017; Kiamehr et al., 2015).
They show that CoPS industries are primarily led by governments in a
top-down manner (Lee and Lim, 2001; Lee and Yoon, 2015; Miao et al.,
2018; Park, 2012). Given that many studies on catch-up focus on the
rapid process in East Asian countries during a period of dictatorship
(e.g. South Korea) or under a communist regime (e.g. China), govern-
ment leadership is often highlighted in explaining their industry for-
mation and catch-up (Hahm and Plein, 1995; Kim, 2004;
Motohashi and Yun, 2007). Although these studies advanced our un-
derstanding of key actors’ (e.g. government, system integrators) en-
dogenous decisions to mobilise resources and enhance capabilities, they
have weak grounding in the literature on windows of opportunity that
address both endogenous efforts and exogenous conditions behind la-
tecomer's catch-up (Miao et al., 2018; Safdari Ranjbar, Park, and Kia-
mehr, 2018).
The concept of ‘windows of opportunity’ was first used by Perez and
Soete (1988) to refer to the role of new techno-economic paradigms in
leapfrogging by latecomers. Lee and Malerba (2017) expanded the
notion of windows of opportunity by linking them to the building
blocks of a sectoral system, thereby proposing three types of windows:
technology, demand, and institutional. First, the technology window
offers latecomers an opportunity to access and absorb new knowledge
and technology that is driven by a shift in the technology paradigm
(Lee and Malerba, 2017; Yap and Truffer, 2019; Vértesy, 2017). Second,
the demand window refers to an opportunity provided by substantial
changes in demand conditions, such as the creation of new demand, the
rapid growth of domestic demand, and abrupt changes in business cy-
cles (Lee and Ki, 2017; Lee and Malerba, 2017; Mu and Lee, 2005).
Third, the institutional window is created through government inter-
vention in an industry or through systematic changes in institutional
conditions (Lee and Malerba, 2017; Vértesy, 2017).
Despite the significant contributions made by studies on windows of
opportunity, prior research shows the need to pay closer attention to at
least two issues so as to better understand latecomers’ catch-up in CoPS.
First, Lee and Malerba (2017, p. 345) explicitly emphasised that ‘al-
though business cycles and/or abrupt changes in market have long been
the subject of research in economics, their link with strategic choices
made by firms, particularly latecomers, has not been explored suffi-
ciently’ (e.g. industrial crisis which releases incumbents’ resources to
latecomers; see Lee and Mathews, 2012). Thus, we argue that disruptive
changes in a forerunner's industry legitimacy causing industrial crisis
have implications for latecomers' catch-up in a CoPS industry, as it
triggers the creation of exogenous windows of opportunity.
Second, although Lee and Malerba (2017, p. 345) explained that
‘windows can be exogenous or endogenous, depending upon responses
by the various actors of a sectoral system’, the extant literature has
treated windows of opportunity as exogenous to the actors in latecomer
countries (see Yap and Truffer, 2019, p. 1032). Moreover, as a number
of catch-up studies tend to focus on technology or capability develop-
ment strategies (See Yap and Truffer, 2019 p. 1033), little research
explicitly analyses how latecomers can form industries by managing a
broad set of activities to develop socio-technical systems such as CoPS
(Safdari Ranjbar et al., 2018). Hence, we distinguish between exo-
genous and endogenous windows of opportunity in proposing a re-
search framework. The endogenous windows of opportunity consider
key activities in TIS that enable latecomers’ successful industry for-
mation (Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007; Yap and
Truffer, 2019). The overarching reasoning in our framework addressing
these two issues is articulated in the following section.
3. Theoretical development
Our research framework (see Fig. 1) consists of three building
blocks: (1) changes in a forerunner's industry legitimacy associated with
exogenous windows of opportunity; (2) endogenous windows of op-
portunity for a latecomer's industry formation; and (3) a latecomer's
catch-up. The main backbone of our building blocks (1) and (2) draws
on the work by Lee and Malerba (2017), as they explain that ‘windows
of opportunity can be exogenous or endogenous’ (p. 345). The frame-
work demonstrates a feedback relationship between building blocks (1)
and (2). On the one hand, the arrow from building block (1) to (2)
describes a latecomer's passive response to exogenous windows of op-
portunity derived from the changes in forerunners’ industry legitimacy.
In fact, in the early stage of catch-up, most latecomers passively re-
spond to the exogenous windows by simply importing technologies
from forerunners (Hobday, 1995). On the other hand, the arrow from
building block (2) to (1) represents a latecomer's active response to the
changes in a forerunner's industry legitimacy. As a latecomer's industry
grows, it can actively exploit exogenous windows of opportunities with
its effective TIS.
In building block (1), we explain the role of a forerunner's industry
legitimacy, which is defined in our study as the perceived consonance
of an industry with its institutional environment, i.e. a socially con-
structed set of norms, values, beliefs, and practices in its context
(Scott, 2001; Suchman, 1995). Grounded in the work of
Suchman (1995) and Binz et al. (2016), we posit that industry legiti-
macy can be divided into three key dimensions. Pragmatic legitimacy is
the most basic form of legitimacy, as it rests on self-interest from the
perspective of the value delivery of an industry to the most immediate
K. Kwak and H.D. Yoon Research Policy 49 (2020) 103954
2
audiences (Binz et al., 2016). Moral legitimacy is normative, which is
based on an evaluation that industrial activities are consistent with
existing regulations and moral obligations (Binz et al., 2016). The final
kind of legitimacy, cognitive legitimacy, is the degree to which an in-
dustry is seen as taken for granted (Binz et al., 2016).
Subsequently, we argue that the loss of industry legitimacy by
forerunners is a relevant issue in a CoPS industry that deserves attention
because it induces a downturn in forerunners' industry, thereby re-
leasing their resources to latecomers (Jonsson et al., 2009; Lee and
Mathews, 2012; Mathews, 2005). Forerunners are deemed as lacking
legitimacy when their activities are not desirable or do not conform to
prevailing societal norms and standards (Hiatt et al., 2009; Kim et al.,
2016). Insufficient industry legitimacy may lead to unstable links with
users, distract their attention, and the withholding of material or
ideational support to an industry (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). As a result,
forerunners experiencing industrial crisis derived from insufficient in-
dustry legitimacy look for new business opportunities outside their
domestic market (e.g. building a new CoPS in latecomer countries). In
particular, given the low bargaining power of the forerunner derived
from its industrial crisis, technology transfer terms can easily be in-
cluded in business arrangements between a forerunner and a latecomer.
In other words, a loss of a forerunner's industry legitimacy can induce
discounts on state-of-the art technologies for latecomers to easily ac-
quire and accumulate forerunner's core knowledge base and technolo-
gies. Therefore, it can serve as an exogenous window of opportunity for
latecomers.
In addition to the change in a forerunner's industry legitimacy,
providing favourable exogenous windows of opportunity for lateco-
mer's catch-up, building block (2) explains that latecomers need to
manage a set of innovation activities to endogenise windows of op-
portunity (Yap and Truffer, 2019) that occur in the domestic context of
the latecomer country. Specifically, we draw on the six TIS core ac-
tivities (Bergek et al., 2008; Binz et al., 2014; Hekkert et al., 2007) by
considering the three perspectives on windows of opportunity (see
building block (2) in Fig. 1).
First, the technological perspective covers activities that help late-
comers overcome their intrinsic weakness in technological capability.
The activities include knowledge development, the creation of legiti-
macy, guidance of search, and entrepreneurial experimentation. Given
the technological complexity of a CoPS, which requires integration of
diverse inter-dependant components and sub-systems, knowledge de-
velopment is critical during the industry inception and serves as a
foundation for catch-up (Lee and Yoon, 2015; Park, 2012). The creation
of legitimacy through institutional alignment in the domestic context
can also facilitate a variety of technology development activities
(Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007). Guidance of search can
promote knowledge accumulation in a specific technological field cor-
responding to the emergence of public expectations, visions, and beliefs
in the growth of an industry (Bergek et al., 2008; Park, 2012; Yap and
Truffer, 2019). Entrepreneurial experimentation to combine technolo-
gical knowledge with market applications can contribute to a lateco-
mer's technological accumulation (Hekkert et al., 2007; Tigabu et al.,
2015).
Second, the demand perspective addresses the activities that drive
growth in the domestic market, including market formation, guidance
of search, entrepreneurial experimentation, and the creation of legiti-
macy. Market formation in latecomers' CoPS is generally initiated by
governments in the form implementing a variety of policy instruments
including tax subsidies, support of new standards, and public procure-
ment (Park, 2012; Vértesy, 2017). Guidance of search driven by the
changing preferences of society and lead customers can create demand
for a new technology (Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007). Si-
milarly, we expect that entrepreneurial experimentation creates new
solutions to existing problems, thereby creating new market demand
(Hekkert et al., 2007). Legitimacy creation takes place through the
development of informal industrial alliances (e.g. amongst supportive
advocacy coalitions, interest groups, networks, intermediaries) that
contribute to the creation of early (niche) markets which act as
Fig. 1. Research framework.
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beachheads for the mainstream market (Bergek et al., 2008; Binz et al.,
2014; Hekkert et al., 2007).
Third, the institutional perspective encompasses the activities led by
both government authorities (Lee and Malerba, 2017) and civil society
(Binz and Truffer, 2017; Wirth et al., 2013) that include resource mo-
bilisation, the creation of legitimacy, the guidance of search, and en-
trepreneurial experimentation. Mobilising resources (e.g. finance,
human capital) based on favourable government regulation and a
supportive culture in the industry is critical for industry formation and
catch-up (Park, 2012; Vértesy, 2017; Wirth et al., 2013). Various in-
stitutional instruments (e.g. maintenance of favourable intellectual
property regimes, provision of subsidies, and the construction of a
shared belief system) can be a catalyst for the creation of industry le-
gitimacy (Hekkert et al., 2007; Wirth et al., 2013). Guidance of search
as a technology selection process comes in the form of government
policy and corresponding regulations (Bergek et al., 2008;
Hekkert et al., 2007). Entrepreneurial experimentation is also im-
portant for a latecomer's industry formation through political lobbying
to obtain specific policies or regulations that support favourable de-
velopment of an industry (Hekkert et al., 2007; Jacobsson and
Bergek, 2011).
As a whole, the framework explains that the combination of (1)
changes in a forerunner's industry legitimacy (creating windows of
opportunity for a latecomer to gain access to an external knowledge
base) and (2) endogenous windows of opportunity (triggering the la-
tecomer to become committed to technological innovation activities)
contributes to latecomers’ successful catch-up. The final output of the
framework, ‘catch-up’, is evidenced from its evolution from a turnkey
importer, in which latecomers rely on subcontracting arrangements to
accumulate production and manufacturing knowledge (i.e. status of
original equipment manufacturer [OEM]) (Hobday, 1995) to a global
exporter, in which latecomers export their indigenously developed
CoPS on the global market (i.e. similar to the status of original brand
manufacturer [OBM]) (Kiamehr et al., 2015; Lee and Yoon, 2015;
Vértesy, 2017).
4. Research design
4.1. Context
Nuclear power plants (NPP) and their related systems are con-
sidered typical CoPS (see Davies and Brady, 1998; Dedehayir et al.,
2014; Hobday, 1998; Markard and Truffer, 2006; Son and
Choung, 2014; Walker, 2000). This is because the plants consist of
complex and technology-intensive sub-systems, such as a nuclear steam
supply system (NSSS), turbine generator system, and other supporting
and auxiliary systems. They are structured in a hierarchical manner in
which the sub-systems are also composed of many parts and a lot of
equipment. In this structure, each sub-system, part, and piece of
equipment is highly independent and interrelated and should be in-
tegrated to ensure the optimal performance of the NPPs. Moreover,
because of its high cost, customised delivery, and low-volume produc-
tion, regulatory institutions intervene in the market in terms of local
market creation, safety management, local supply chain protection, and
financing.
In addition to the representativeness of NPPs, the industry is ideal
for investigating the role of legitimacy in creating exogenous windows
of opportunity because it has experienced many ups and downs as a
result of the changes in societal values and the dissenting views be-
tween technology proponents and anti-nuclear activists (Garud et al.,
2010; Geels and Verhees, 2011; Ross and Staw, 1993). The nuclear
power industry's biggest challenge is ‘not one of technical or even cost
difficulties, but of maintaining a veneer of legitimacy’ (Stoett, 2003, p.
99). After the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, the legitimacy of
nuclear power industry severely declined worldwide (Froggatt and
Schneider, 2011; Kim et al., 2013; Ramana, 2011) .1 This event shows
that legitimacy of nuclear power industry can be withdrawn by acci-
dents or industrial hazards or when a focal actor's activities are un-
desirable or do not conform to prevailing societal norms (Hiatt et al.,
2009; Kim et al., 2016).
Despite the disruptive consequences of these hazardous events,
nuclear power is still recognised as an attractive energy source. Many
studies have highlighted the contribution of nuclear power in reducing
CO2 emissions (e.g., Apergis et al., 2010; IEA, 2018; Menyah and Wold-
Rufael, 2010). Moreover, it was found that nuclear power has a higher
utilisation rate (ratio of its actual output over a period of time to its
potential output at full capacity) than photovoltaic (i.e. solar) and wind
power (Zhang et al., 2012). Because of these environmental and eco-
nomic benefits, many governments are re-considering the share of nu-
clear power in their future energy generation (Cîrstea et al., 2018;
IEA, 2018; Oshiro et al., 2017). In fact, even though China suspended
the approval of new NPPs since the Fukushima nuclear accident in
2011, it officially resumed approving new coastal nuclear power pro-
jects in December 2014 (Guo and Guo, 2016; World Nuclear
Association, 2019). These accounts show that catching up in the nuclear
power industry is neither on the wrong track in industrial development
nor driven by a forerunner's entry into alternative industries (e.g. re-
newable energy).
4.2. Analytical approach
Our analysis investigates the process of technological advancement
in the Korean nuclear power industry based on critical changes in the
legitimacy of the global nuclear power industry, opening of exogenous
windows of opportunity, and indigenous efforts to endogenise windows
of opportunity for catch-up. In particular, regarding the oper-
ationalisation of legitimacy, we focus on industry legitimacy
(Markard et al., 2016) as we are mainly interested in capturing how
knowledge or technology is liberated and transferred from forerunner
to latecomer corresponding to the change in the forerunner's industry
legitimacy. We rely on the three types of legitimacy (i.e., pragmatic,
moral, and cognitive) in Suchman (1995) in our analysis. Whereas prior
studies on industry legitimacy tend to treat legitimacy at the aggregate
level, our analysis explains the dynamics of transnational industry le-
gitimacy using a variety of dimensions (Binz et al., 2016). This is mainly
because various characteristics embedded in CoPS (e.g. NPP safety,
mitigation of CO2 emissions by NPPs, economic efficiency of nuclear
energy, technological and economic spillover to downstream in-
dustries) naturally have different implications for legitimacy.
Subsequently, we use a multi-dimensional approach to capture
pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy. First, pragmatic legitimacy
is identified by considering the supply of low-cost electricity, economic
growth, and enhanced profitability stemming from the formation of the
nuclear power industry and technological self-reliance. Second, moral
legitimacy is traced through key social movements that address issues
on ‘civilian nuclear power’ (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989), eco-
friendliness in power generation, and anti-nuclear initiatives
(Beelitz and Merkl-Davis, 2012; Geels and Verhees, 2011; Walker and
Wellock, 2010). Lastly, cognitive legitimacy is addressed by in-
vestigating whether the nuclear power industry is perceived as an es-
sential part of national security and an inevitable energy source and has
1 In September 2012, the Japanese government announced an ‘innovative
energy-environmental policy’ aimed at achieving zero nuclear power genera-
tion in the 2030s (Homma and Akimoto, 2013). Germany shut down all se-
venteen of its operational nuclear power reactors, and Switzerland agreed to
phase out its five aging power reactors (Froggatt and Schneider, 2011). Italy
decided to exclude nuclear energy from its future energy mix (Froggatt and
Schneider, 2011). Furthermore, U.S. public support for building new reactors
declined from 57 percent in 2008 to 43 percent in March 2011 (Ramana, 2011).
More than forty countries have redirected their policies in nuclear energy after
a change in public attitudes after the accident (Kim et al., 2013).
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safeguards to protect people in the event of industrial disasters (e.g.
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl) (Renn, 1990; Geels and Verhees, 2011;
Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). These dimensions of legitimacy can expand or
contract, depending on the fulfilment of value for constituents and
conformance with the institutions, societal norms, and beliefs at a given
moment (Bitektine, 2011; Geels and Verhees, 2011; Jasanoff and
Kim, 2009; Renn, 1990).
4.3. Data and method
We adopted a longitudinal investigation method along with detailed
narratives to analyse the catch-up in the Korean nuclear power industry
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2014). To this end, we use a
process-tracking method to identify the details of cause and effect
across the three building blocks of our framework (George and
Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2014). To track the catch-up, our analysis docu-
ments key technological advancement across multiple stages from being
an importer to becoming a global exporter.
Our primary data were collected through a series of interviews and
e-mail communications with experts in the Korean nuclear power in-
dustry. We contacted a principal administrator who has been working
for 30 years for the largest organisation in the Korean nuclear power
industry, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), and has
been the head of the auditing and technological commercialisation
department. We also interviewed the former project manager of the first
national research and development project for self-reliance in nuclear
power and the former director of technical cooperation at the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, to ensure the
objectivity of our analysis, we collected additional primary data from a
number of innovation scholars who have investigated the Korean nu-
clear power industry. In total, we conducted 12 interviews with five
experts in the Korean nuclear power industry (8/2017, 5/2018, 7/
2018), including several pilot interviews in a pre-study phase (1/
2017–2/2017), and the other main interviews with experts in innova-
tion management studies to ensure the objectivity of our analysis (2/
2017, 7/2018, and 9/2018).
The interview questions were distributed in advance by e-mail to
allow efficient and accurate communications (Miles and
Huberman, 1994). Each interview lasted approximately one or two
hours, and the interviews were transcribed within 24 h to enhance the
reliability of the interviews. We also shared the draft of our study with
the interviewees to receive their feedback. This means that the inter-
views serve as an important source of historical accounts based on their
extensive knowledge and experience in the Korean nuclear power in-
dustry. The combination of interviews with a variety of experts, such as
public administrators, research scientists, and innovation scholars,
helped in the triangulation of our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Yin, 2014).
In a triangulation effort, we collected a wide range of secondary
data—i.e., academic journal articles, press articles, research papers, and
archival records. To clarify the scope of our secondary data collection,
we first listed the major firms, research institutes, and other stake-
holders in the Korean nuclear power industry. By discussing our ex-
tensive list with the interviewees, we were able to identify key actors,
such as KAERI, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), KEPCO
Engineering & Construction (KEPCO E&C), Doosan Heavy Industries &
Construction (Doosan), and relevant ministries, including their agencies
involved in the formation of Korea's nuclear power industry, as shown
in Fig. 2. Also, we identified the important foreign entities comprising
an external knowledge base corresponding to the change in a fore-
runner's legitimacy based on our secondary data collection (see Fig. 2).
Lastly, we collected additional secondary statistics from the IAEA,
KAERI, KEPCO (including its subsidiaries), and Statistics Korea (see
Table 1).
5. Results
Our analysis consists of three periods (see Fig. 3): (1) from ‘turnkey’
to ‘non-turnkey’ importer (late 1960s–early 1980s), (2) from ‘non-
turnkey’ importer to technological self-reliance (late 1980s–late 2000s),
and (3) from technological self-reliance to the global exporter (2010–).
Table 2 provides details on the catch-up progress in the Korean nuclear
power industry considering the localisation rate, the role of key actors
in formation of the industry, and the level of technological capability.
5.1. From ‘Turnkey’ to ‘Non-Turnkey’ imports from the late 1960s to the
early 1980s
Korea obtained its opportunity to access nuclear technology through
the support of the U.S. in 1950s. The other great power, the Soviet
Union, succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon later than the U.S.,
during the cold war era in the early 1950s. As a result, the U.S. did not
maintain its monopoly on the development of nuclear technology. The
U.S. recognised the importance of spreading its technology to combat
the proliferation of nuclear weapons (KAERI, 2007) and in December
1953 announced ‘Atoms for Peace’ to promote the application of nu-
clear technology for peaceful purposes (Chernus, 2002; Weart, 1988).
This initiative enhanced the moral and cognitive legitimacy of nuclear
technology amongst pro-U.S. countries (Balogh, 1991), enabling Korea
to attain an opportunity to use the technology by signing a cooperation
agreement with the U.S. in 1956 (Choi et al., 2009; Park, 1992). This
shows that the increase in the legitimacy of nuclear energy created a
technology window for a latecomer to access the forerunner's tech-
nology.
Moreover, the increase in the legitimacy of nuclear technology in
the eyes of the Korean public that advocated the view of ‘Atoms for
National Development and Security’ supported the nuclear power
generation in Korea (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Kim and Byrne, 1996).
Koreans understood the need for it, because the country's un-
precedented economic growth had massively increased the rate of
growth in electricity consumption. In addition, they had experienced
having their electricity supply cut by North Korea in 1948 because of
political tension on the Korean Peninsula (KAERI, 2007). As a result,
securing a stable electricity supply was prioritised on the national de-
velopment and security agenda (Sung and Hong, 1999; Valentine and
Sovacool, 2010).
Accordingly, the South Korean government pushed ahead with NPP
construction under the Second Five-year Economic Development Plan
(1967–1971) (Choi et al., 2009; KAERI, 2007). In June 1968, it decided
to build its first NPP, Kori 1 (1972) ,2 which had an electricity-gen-
erating capacity of 587 MWe (megawatt electric, or the electric output
of a power plant in megawatts), based on a turnkey contract, naming
KEPCO as the operator of the NPP (KAERI, 2007; Park, 1992). Wes-
tinghouse (WH), with its pressurised water reactor, was selected to act
as the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) supplier, prime contractor,
and project manager for the construction of this NPP and designated
another foreign firm, Gilbert Associates (GIL), to take charge of archi-
tectural engineering. Although the turnkey contract meant that Korea
was fully dependant on a foreign firm throughout the process of NPP
construction, it deployed its resources to build upon the knowledge
developed and provided by forerunners (Choi et al., 2009; Hong, 2016).
Subsequently, during the two oil shocks in the 1970s, Korea ex-
panded its NPP market, which enhanced the cognitive and pragmatic
legitimacy of nuclear power–based electricity generation. The oil
shocks forced the Korean government to recognise the importance of
NPP expansion for its energy security and economic growth (Choi et al.,
2009; Kim and Byrne, 1996). Major energy-consuming sectors in Korea
2 The number in parentheses after the plant name indicates the year that
construction on each plant started.
K. Kwak and H.D. Yoon Research Policy 49 (2020) 103954
5
(e.g. steel, petrochemical, and shipbuilding) (Choi et al., 2009) sup-
ported the NPP expansion in their self-interest to secure a stable and
low-cost electricity supply, out of pragmatism (KAERI, 2007). The
Korean public also recognised that nuclear power was an irreplaceable
source of energy in their country, which is deficient in natural re-
sources. This favourable public perception confirms the strong presence
of cognitive legitimacy, which highlights the importance of being taken
for granted. At the same time, NPPs were morally legitimised with a
consensus that it could replace coal-fired power generation, which
causes air pollution and other environmental problems (Smith, 1986).
The enhanced legitimacy of NPPs in Korea further encouraged the
government to form a market, mobilise resources, and develop
knowledge. Since the first oil shock in October 1973, the Korean gov-
ernment approved the construction of the six new NPPs (Kori 2 and
Wolsong 1 in 1978, Kori 3 and 4 in 1980, and Hanbit 1 and 2 in 1981)
(see Table 2), whose total electricity generation capacity was about
5000 MWe (MOTIE and KHNP, 2016). In 1977 the government estab-
lished the Ministry of Energy and Resources, which was responsible for
designing and implementing policy on the nuclear power industry and
managing the construction, operation, and maintenance of NPPs
Fig. 2. Key actors in Korean nuclear power industry.
Table 1
Data sources.
Type Collection period Major content
Primary data
Face-to-face and telephone interviews 1/2017–2/2017, 8/2017, 5/2018,
7/2018, 9/2018
Historical narratives of Korea's technological learning in NPPs; International technology transfer
agreements; Validation of the analyses results
Secondary data
Korea Power Exchange (subsidiary of
KEPCO)
6/2018 Historical data on the weight of nuclear power for electricity generation in Korea based on Electric
Power Statistics Information System (EPSIS); -Coverage: From 1961 to 2015
Statistics Korea 5/2018 Historical data on electricity generation capacity and electricity usage in Korea; -Coverage: From
1962 to 2016
IAEA 5/2018 Historical data on the number of NPPs under construction and operation by country-Coverage: From
1960 to 2017; -Coverage: From 1978 to 2017
KAERI 4/2018–5/2018 Technical and industrial reports on Korean and global NPPs: KAERI (2007), ‘Investigation on the 50
Years of Nuclear Development in Korea’. Ministry of Science and Technology Korea
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Fig. 3. Construction year of Korean nuclear power plants.
Table 2
Catch-up of the Korean nuclear power industry: From Turnkey Importer to Global Exporter.
Source: Adapted from Ahn and Han (1998), Choi (1980), Choi et al. (2010), Holt (2010), Hong (2016), IAEA (2019), KEEI (2012), KIER (2017), MOST (2007),
MOTIE and KHNP (2016), National Archives of Korea (2006a), National Archives of Korea (2006b), Park (1992), Sung and Hong (1999), and authors’ analysis based
on the interviews.
No.a Name Capacity
(MWe)
Localization
Rateb
Prime
Contractorc
Architectural
Engineering
ProjectManager Status of
Tech. Capability
(Brand Name)
Construction
Start Date
Commercial
Operation Date
Current Status
1 Kori 1 587 8% WH GIL WH Turnkey Import Apr. 1972 Apr. 1978 Shut Down
2 Wolsong 1 679 14% AECL AECL AECL Turnkey Import Oct. 1977 Apr. 1983 Shut Down
3 Kori 2 650 13% WH GIL WH Turnkey Import Dec. 1977 Jul. 1983 Operating
4 Kori 3d 950 29% WH Bechtel KEPCO Non-Turnkey Import Oct. 1979 Sep. 1985 Operating
5 Kori 4d 950 Apr. 1980 Apr. 1986
6 Hanbit 1 950 35% WH Bechtel/
KEPCO E&C
KEPCO Non-Turnkey Import Jun. 1981 Aug. 1986 Operating
7 Hanbit 2 950 Dec. 1981 Jun. 1987
8 Hanul 1 950 40% FRAM FRAM, ALS/
KEPCO E&C
KEPCO Non-Turnkey Import Jan. 1983 Sep. 1988 Operating
9 Hanul 2 950 Jul. 1983 Sep. 1989
10 Hanbit 3e 1000 74% Doosan,
KAERI/CE
KEPCO E&C/S&L KEPCO Licensed from
CE (System80)f
Dec. 1989 Mar. 1995 Operating
11 Hanbit 4e 1000 May. 1990 Jan. 1996
12 Wolsong 2 700 58% AECL/DHI AECL/
KEPCO E&C
KEPCO Non-Turnkey Import Jun. 1992 Jul. 1997 Operating
13 Hanul 3 1000 75% Doosan,
KAERI/CE
KEPCO
E&C
KEPCO Self-Reliance
(KSNP)
Jul. 1993 Aug. 1998 Operating
14 Hanul 4 1000 Nov. 1993 Dec. 1999
15 Wolsong 3 700 67% AECL/DHI AECL/
KEPCO E&C
KEPCO Licensed from AECL
(CANDU-600)
Mar. 1994 Jul. 1998 Operating
16 Wolsong 4 700 Jul. 1994 Oct. 1999
17 Hanbit 5 1000 79% Doosan, KEP
CO E&C/CE
KEPCO
E&C
KHNP Self-Reliance
(OPR1000(KSNP+))
Jun. 1997 May. 2002 Operating
18 Hanbit 6 1000 Nov. 1997 Dec. 2002
19 Hanul 5 1000 79% Doosan, KEP
CO E&C/CE
KEPCO
E&C
KHNP Self-Reliance
(OPR1000(KSNP+))
Oct. 1999 Jul. 2004 Operating
20 Hanul 6 1000 Sep. 2000 Apr. 2005
21 Shin-Kori 1 1000 78% Doosan, KEP
CO E&C/CE
KEPCO
E&C
KHNP Self-Reliance
(Improved
OPR1000)
Jun. 2006 Feb. 2011 Operating
22 Shin-Kori 2 1000 Jun. 2007 Jul. 2012
23 Shin-
Wolsong 1
1000 Doosan, KEP
CO E&C/CE
KEPCO
E&C
KHNP Self-Reliance
(Improved
OPR1000)
Nov. 2007 Jul. 2012 Operating
24 Shin-
Wolsong 2
1000 Sep. 2008 Jul. 2015
25 Shin-Kori
3g
1400 95%h Doosan,
KEPCO E&C
KEPCO
E&C
KHNP Self-Reliance
(APR-1400)
Oct. 2008 Dec. 2016 Operating
26 Shin-Kori 4 1400 Aug. 2009 Aug. 2019
27 Shin-Hanul
1
1400 100%i Doosan,
KEPCO E&C
KEPCO
E&C
KHNP Self-Reliance
(APR-1400)
Jul. 2012 Under
Construction
28 Shin-Hanul
2
1400 Jun. 2013
29 Barakah 1 1400 95%i Doosan,
KEPCO E&C
KEPCO
E&C
KEPCO/
KHNP
Global Exporter
(APR-1400)
Jul. 2012 Under
Construction30 Barakah 2 1400 Apr. 2013
31 Barakah 3 1400 Sep. 2014
32 Barakah 4 1400 Jul. 2015
33 Shin-Kori 5 1400 100% Doosan,
KEPCO E&C
KEPCO
E&C
KHNP Self-Reliance
(APR-1400)
Apr. 2017 Under
Construction34 Shin-Kori 6 1400 Sep. 2018
a Listed in the order of construction start (commercial operation).
b Represents the rate of domestic supply by considering the financial value of components.
c Prime Contractors are NSSS suppliers.
d Used as the reference model for 2 successive NPPs (Hanbit 1 and 2).
e Used as the reference model for 10 successive NPPs (Hanul 3 and 4, Hanbit 5 and 6, Hanul 5, and 6, Shin-Kori 1 and 2, Shin-Wolsong 1 and 2).
f Scaled-down version of the System 80 of CE with 1300 Mwe.
g Used as the reference model for Barakah 1–4 NPPs.
h Achieved localization except the MMIS (Man Machine Interface System) and RCP (Reactor Coolant Pump).
i Based on the localization and application of MMIS and RCP.
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(Hong, 2016). The ministry adhered in particular to ‘economic load
despatch approaches’3 and prioritised nuclear power in Korea's energy
mix. As a result, in 1987, when seven NPPs were in commercial op-
eration, the proportion of nuclear power in electricity generation
reached a peak of 53.3% (see Fig. 4).
At the peak, many local entrepreneurial firms in civil and con-
struction engineering, equipment manufacturing, and architectural
engineering sectors entered the industry in response to the formation of
a domestic NPP market. Specifically, to encourage the knowledge de-
velopment related to architectural engineering, the Korea Atomic
Energy Research Institute (KAERI), KEPCO, and eleven private firms co-
established Korea Nuclear Engineering (afterwards, KEPCO E&C as a
subsidiary of KEPCO) in 1976 with the goal of training engineers and
offering technical consultation (Hong, 2016; KAERI, 2007). Further-
more, an industrial alliance (e.g. Korean Atomic Industry Forum
[1972]) and academic societies (e.g. Korean Nuclear Society [1968])
were established with government approval for knowledge develop-
ment and the creation of legitimacy, to enhance public acceptance of
nuclear power.
In particular, in the late 1970s, to facilitate the development of local
knowledge based on the absorption of foreign technology, the Korean
government initiated six NPP construction projects, from Kori 3 to
Hanul 2 (see Table 2) under non-turnkey contracts (Choi et al., 2009;
Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Sung and Hong, 1999). Specifically, the
Korean government constructed two NPPs in the same place with the
same electricity capacity and reactor type. The government expected
this approach to have an advantage in enhancing project management
capability and in developing a local supply chain under non-turnkey
contracts based on economies of scale. This approach was also applied
in the construction of Kori 3 and 4, Hanbit 1 and 2, and Hanul 1 and 2.
The fourth and fifth NPPs (Kori 3 and 4) are reference models for two
successive NPPs (Hanbit 1 and 2) with regard to their architectural
engineering, equipment manufacturing, and civil engineering.
The creation of the market under non-turnkey contracts promoted
knowledge development for some key actors in the Korean nuclear
power industry. Specifically, KEPCO was designated as the project
manager in charge of civil engineering in the construction of Kori 3 and
4 (Holt, 2010). In addition, KEPCO specified the target localisation rate
and explicitly demanded that foreign partners license technologies re-
lated to equipment manufacturing and architectural engineering
(Choi et al., 2009; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; KAERI, 2007). This en-
couraged the participation of local entrepreneurial firms in the con-
struction of NPPs as sub-contractors to assimilate and internalise ad-
vanced technology (Choi et al., 2009; Park, 1992; Sung and
Hong, 1999). As a result, the localisation rate in the engineering,
equipment procurement, and construction gradually increased from 8
to 14% in the first three turnkey contract–based NPPs to 29–40% in the
successive six non-turnkey contract–based NPPs (from Kori 3 to Hanul
2) (see Table 2). KEPCO E&C acted as a sub-contractor in the archi-
tectural engineering of Hanbit 1 and 2 and Hanul 1 and 2 and suc-
cessfully acquired design capabilities (Sung and Hong, 1999).
5.2. From ‘Non-Turnkey’ imports to technological self-reliance from the late
1980s to the late 2000s
Despite Korea's transition from turnkey to non-turnkey importer, the
dependence on foreign contractors for architectural engineering re-
stricted knowledge development by local firms. Because of this tech-
nological dependence, KEPCO encountered a sharp increase in NPP
construction costs (Hanbit 1 and 2), even though Kori 3 and 4 used the
same contractor, Bechtel (MOST, 2007) due to insufficient knowledge
of NSSS design, architectural engineering, and technical and economic
feasibility analysis. A multiple sourcing strategy based on guidance of
search led by the Korean government in selecting prime contractors
(WH, AECL, and FRAM) for their first nine NPPs (see Table 2) hindered
Korean firms from effectively accumulating and integrating various
knowledge and skills.
After encountering this problem, major actors in the industry (i.e.
KEPCO, KEPCO E&C, Doosan, and KAERI) recognised the value of
technological self-reliance. From a pragmatic perspective, to further
reduce the construction cost, they organised the Electric Power Group
Corporation Council (EPGCC) supervised by the Ministry of Energy and
Resources in April 1985. They suggested ‘standardisation’ of NPPs,
which implies repetitive design and the construction of pressurised
water reactor–type NPPs to accumulate technological capability via
‘learning by repetition’ (Ahn and Han, 1998; Hong, 2016). For stan-
dardisation, EPGCC recommended compulsory technology transfer
from forerunners with the contract on Hanbit 3 and 4 (Ahn and
Fig. 4. Nuclear power for electricity generation in Korea.
3 The approach prefers an electricity source for baseload operation, which
satisfies electricity demand at the lowest possible cost compared with alter-
natives, such as oil, natural gas, and renewable energy
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Han, 1998). Although the compulsory technology transfer was very
costly, the EPGCC believed that it was crucial to achieve technological
self-reliance (Sung and Hong, 1999). Following the suggestion of the
council, the Korean government invited bids with the condition of
compulsory technology transfer on NSSS design in October 1985
(Hong, 2016; KAERI, 2007).
In particular, the KAERI played a critical role in achieving self-re-
liance to reduce the construction cost and maintain the pragmatic le-
gitimacy of the industry with its active engagement and resource
commitment. At the time, the political dispute between the U.S. and
Korean governments caused by suspicion of nuclear weapons develop-
ment could have resulted in the closure of the KAERI (Jasanoff and
Kim, 2009). Furthermore, the fact that the electricity use rate had
reached the lowest point in its history, around 40% during the 1980s
(Fig. 5) because of economic recession, threatened the KAERI's ex-
istence. Despite the unfavourable circumstances, the KAERI worked
hard to achieve technological self-reliance and maintain the pragmatic
legitimacy of the industry. Coincidentally, public perception about the
legitimacy of nuclear power industry at the time remained impreg-
nable, thereby supporting the self-reliance effort (Jasanoff and
Kim, 2009).
Beyond the increase in nuclear power industry legitimacy in the
domestic market, the severe decrease in the cognitive legitimacy of the
nuclear power industry in transnational contexts was triggered by cri-
tical accidents at Three Mile Island in the U.S. in March 1979 and
Chernobyl in the Soviet Union in April 1986. The aftermath of these
incidents created windows for Korea to pursue technological self-re-
liance, because the pause in the legitimacy of nuclear power halted
construction of or cancelled orders for NPPs around the world
(Choi et al., 2009; Sung and Hong, 1999). The U.S. had not constructed
any new NPPs for 35 years (Davies, 2012). Most of the NSSS suppliers
in the world, i.e., WH, FRAM, AECL, CE (Combustion Engineering), and
General Electric, experienced serious financial problems. For instance,
Babcock & Wilcox, the NSSS suppliers of the Three Mile Island NPP,
went bankrupt. Additionally, as the economic feasibility of using gas-
fired power plants for base load electricity had been confirmed
(Islas, 1999; Watson, 1997), the moral legitimacy of NPPs as an eco-
friendly energy source was significantly diminished. Thus, the severe
decrease in the legitimacy of forerunners’ nuclear power industry
empowered latecomers to negotiate compulsory technology transfer on
favourable terms.
In sum, forerunners’ decreased industry legitimacy provided a
window of opportunity for Korea to gain stronger bargaining power in
acquiring core technology from forerunners by mobilising resources at
a lower cost (Lee and Malerba, 2017; Lee and Mathews, 2012). In other
words, Korea was able to take advantage of a significant downturn in
global nuclear power industry in order to expand its knowledge and
skills and to internalise them in an affordable manner (Lee and
Mathews, 2012; Mathews, 2005). The effect of the global industry
downturn was even more critical for Korea in acquiring the technology
than the increase in the construction cost of Hanbit 3 and 4 by more
than 1.5 times higher over that of previous NPPs because of the massive
licensing fee.
With this shift in bargaining power, KEPCO and KAERI succeeded in
negotiating a compulsory technology transfer (especially NSSS design)
contract with CE in April 1978 to construct Hanbit 3 and 4
(Hong, 2016). The contract included the transfer and sharing of tech-
nical documents, computerised design codes, and patents. It also spe-
cified the provision of job training and consultation by CE to carry out
joint design and development projects (Ahn and Han, 1998; Sung and
Hong, 1999; Hong, 2016; see Table 4). KEPCO and KAERI had access to
all the explicit knowledge and know-how of CE engineers (Sung and
Hong, 1999). In particular, the condition of joint design and develop-
ment specified that all the risks regarding the delay or performance
problems are responsible for CE, and all relevant knowledge had be
transferred to KEPCO and KAERI within three years of signing of the
contract.
KAERI and KEPCO took advantage of the compulsory technology
transfer terms, and their role in knowledge development, resource
mobilisation, and entrepreneurial experimentations was critical in
achieving technological self-reliance. KAERI was designated as the
main contractor of NSSS design for the construction of Hanbit 3 and 4,
because of all the key actors in the industry KAERI had the best R&D
capability to absorb the NSSS design technology (Sung and Hong, 1999;
MOST, 2007). KAERI dispatched its 200 scientists and engineers to CE
in the U.S. (late 1986 to mid-1989) to acquire NSSS design technology.
Beyond the learning of ‘know-how’ from CE, KAERI put great effort into
learning the ‘know-why’, by organising regular seminars amongst
Fig. 5. Electricity generation capacity and electricity usage in Korea (MW,%).
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KAERI engineers, networking with CE engineers to acquire tacit
knowledge, and documenting NSSS design verification in Korean
(MOST, 2007). KEPCO fully sponsored the cost of dispatching KAERI
engineers and its own engineers (1000 people) for NSSS design ver-
ification. The cost accounted for more than half of KEPCO's R&D ex-
penditure (Sung and Hong, 1999).
As a result, Korea internalised the NSSS design technology at 1000
MWe by constructing Hanbit 3 and 4 in the mid-1990s, grounded in
CE's System 80, thereby achieving technological self-reliance. In the
late 1990s, Korea repeated the design and construction of ten NPPs.4 It
also developed its own brands using NSSS design technology, including
Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP), Optimized Power Reactor
(OPR) 1000 (MWe), and Improved OPR 1000 (see Table 2). Moreover,
the successful formation of an NPP market led by the government fa-
cilitated intensive knowledge development, given the maturity and the
large scale (10 GWe) of the industry. After receiving NSSS design
technology from KAERI, KEPCO E&C, and Doosan participated in the
NPP construction as prime contractors since the Hanbit 5 and 6 and
gradually improved the capability related to safety and efficiency in
power generation, reliability, effective maintenance, and reduction of
the construction cost of the last four NPPs: Shin-Kori 1 and 2 (2007) and
Shin-Wolsong 1 and 2 (2008). The involvement of foreign sub-con-
tractors in the review and consultation of projects significantly de-
clined, and the localisation rate in engineering, equipment procure-
ment, and construction reached about 80% in 2008 (Table 2).
After becoming technologically self-reliant, the key actors (i.e.,
KHNP, KEPCO, KEPCO E&C, KAERI, and Doosan) engaged in en-
trepreneurial experimentation to develop a completely indigenous
technology Advanced Power Reactor (APR) capable of generating 1400
MWe (hereafter APR 1400). The purpose of developing the APR 1400
was to build NPPs that comply with international safety standards
(Park and Chevalier, 2010) and are highly efficient because of their
high capacity (1400 MWe) and an extended service time (60 years) as a
base-load power generator so as to respond to growing electricity de-
mand in Korea (Choi et al., 2009; see Fig. 4). Also, the government and
the key actors had achieved a strong consensus on the technological and
economic spillover effects of the APP 1400 on other related industries,
such as the equipment sector (Hong, 2016). Under the government's
long-term resource mobilisation of R&D (USD 200 million in seven
years) (Son and Choung, 2014), the key actors developed the APR1400
in 2002 and installed it at Shin-Kori 3 and 4 and Shin-Hanul 1 and 2
(Table 2). With this entrepreneurial experimentation, Korea achieved a
100% localisation rate in the construction of Shin-Hanul 1 and 2.
5.3. From technological self-reliance to a global exporter since 2010
Even after achieving technological self-reliance in the early 2000s,
Korea faced legitimacy challenges from the public. The international
anti-nuclear movement since the late 1980s triggered a decrease in
moral legitimacy in Korea (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Renn, 1990). Also,
the Korean government's ineffective efforts to identify disposal sites for
low- and medium-level radioactive waste further damaged the in-
dustry's legitimacy. Over 20 years (1986–2005), nine attempts were
made and failed, which significantly reduced the legitimacy of nuclear
power industry (Choi et al., 2009; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; see Table 5).
The public desire for ‘Atoms for National Development and Security’
had diminished. Instead, environmental groups and anti-nuclear acti-
vists began to challenge the government's plan for NPP expansion
(Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Valentine and Sovacool, 2010).
To respond to these challenges, the Korean government established
the Korea Nuclear Energy Foundation (KNEF) in 1992 by mobilising
financial resources (on average USD 5 million per year) (Chung and
Kim, 2018; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). The KNEF was involved in
managing public relations, advertising, and delivering education pro-
grammes to address this decreased legitimacy. Despite its efforts, it was
almost impossible to stop the expansion in the anti-nuclear movement
in Korea. As a result, the Korean government had difficulty in selecting
new NPP construction sites, thereby inevitably delaying the construc-
tion of Hanbit 5 and 6 (1997) for more than a year (Park, 1992;
Valentine and Sovacool, 2010). Subsequently, the government designed
long-term plans to invest in electricity generation that reduced the
proportion of nuclear power in the long run (see Fig. 6).
To cope with the decreased moral legitimacy in the domestic
market, the key actors tried to export their technology (OPR1000 and
APR1400), with government support since the late 1990s
(Berthelemy and Leveque, 2011; Hong, 2016; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009)
.5 At the time, the global nuclear power market began to grow after a
long silence, as emerging countries experienced rapid growth in their
demand for electricity corresponding to their economic growth
(IAEA, 2018; Wade and Walters, 2011), as shown in Fig. 6, Fig.7. In
other words, economic growth in emerging countries created favour-
able conditions for Korea to export its technology. Accordingly, the
country aggressively pursued export sales of its reactors, equipment,
and design and maintenance services to China and other emerging
countries in Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe (Jasanoff and
Kim, 2009).
In the late 2009, KEPCO won a USD 20.4 billion turnkey contract to
develop four NPPs (Barakah 1–4, constructed since 2012) with the
APR1400 for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after competing against a
U.S.-Japan joint consortium (GE and Hitachi) and a French consortium
(AREVA). Winning the contract enabled Korea to come the sixth NPP
exporter in the world (Hindmarsh and Priestley, 2015) due to the cost
advantage of the Korean NPP with its excellent operating performance
and competitive pricing against other forerunners and reputation
earned from other construction projects by Korean firms in the Middle
East with on-time delivery. In addition, strong support by the Korean
government via mobilisation of attractive project financing terms and
military assistance contributed to its winning the contract
(Berthelemy and Leveque, 2011; Kane and Pomper, 2014).
Notably, the resource mobilisation by the key Korean industrial
actors to offer education and training programmes to the UAE was also
critical in winning the contract (Holt, 2010). As with Korea's experience
in the late 1980s, the declining industry legitimacy of the nuclear power
industry in Korea created favourable conditions for the UAE to access a
forerunners’ knowledge base. With the strong quest by the UAE to in-
ternalise knowledge, Korea offered it the co-establishment and opera-
tion of nuclear engineering departments and collaborative research
programmes (Khalifa University). Korea also supported training pro-
grammes for the construction, operation, maintenance, and safety
regulatory personnel of the Emirate Nuclear Energy Corporation
(ENEC) and the Federal Authority of Nuclear Regulation (FNAR) in the
UAE. The chairman of ENEC stated that Korea's dedicated resource
commitment and knowledge transfer was another important reason for
choosing it over the other bidders (ENEC, 2009).
Furthermore, KEPCO's previous entrepreneurial experience in for-
eign market development through the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organisation (KEDO) project to construct two OPR 1000
NPPs in North Korea was critical in winning the contract in the UAE.
With the KEDO project, the government endeavoured to repair industry
legitimacy by emphasizing that the industry can contribute to peace
and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009).
Accordingly, the Korean government offered to cover 70% of the NPP
construction cost for the KEPCO's KEDO bid. To prepare the bid for the
project, KEPCO prepared all the documents in English to meet the
4 The ten NPPs are Hanul 3 and 4, Hanbit 5 and 6, Hanul 5 and 6, Shin-Kori 1
and 2, and Shin-Wolsong 1 and 2
5 For the purpose of foreign market development, KEPCO and DHIC renamed
their brand from KSNP to OPR 1000
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international requirements for persuading KEDO's member countries,
i.e., Japan, the U.S., the European Union, Australia, and others. Even
though the project, initiated in 1996, eventually fell apart in 2006
because of the political tension over North Korea's nuclear weapons
(Takeda, 2005), it was the first overseas project for KEPCO as a prime
contractor in NPP construction.
After winning the UAE contract, the Korean government announced
a long-term plan to nurture the nuclear power industry as a core export
industry and to capture 20% of the global nuclear power market by
2030 (Berthelemy and Leveque, 2011; Holt, 2010; Kane and
Pomper, 2014). To implement the plan, the government mobilised the
national budget in establishing a Nuclear Powers Cooperation Division
in the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy and moved the export
function of KEPCO to KHNP (Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power) for
systematic development of the foreign market. The resource mobilisa-
tion efforts in the nuclear power industry also led to the establishment
of seven new nuclear engineering departments at universities between
2010 and 2015.
However, since the explosion of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant in Japan in 2011, Korean perceptions of the nuclear power
industry seem negative, especially from a cognitive perspective
(Chung and Kim, 2018; Kim et al., 2013). Even though the two NPPs
under construction, Shin-Kori 5 (2017) and Shin-Kori 6 (2018), suc-
ceeded in gaining moral legitimacy thanks to the efforts of a publicity
campaign and social activists who played an important role in en-
couraging a favourable public opinion in 2017 (Shin-Kori 5 and 6
Public Opinion Committee, 2017), Koreans no longer perceive nuclear
power as a legitimate electricity source (Chung and Kim, 2018).
Fig. 6. Korean government's investment plan for NPP-based electricity generation.
Fig. 7. Transition in the world NPP market: From developed to emerging countries.
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According to a national survey on NPPs by KNEF in 2016, the pro-
portion of citizens who hold a negative perception of NPP expansion
(61.3%) was the highest since the survey was first conducted in 1995
(KNEF, 2017). In May 2017, the newly elected president, Moon Jae-In,
declared a halt in the construction of additional nuclear power plants
and a steep decrease in the proportion of nuclear power used in the
generation of electricity (see Fig. 6).
5.4. Summary of findings
Our longitudinal analysis shows that transnational industry legiti-
macy dynamics and domestic industry formation efforts influenced
Korea's catch-up in nuclear power industry (see Table 3). First, during
the period from ‘turnkey’ to ‘non-turnkey’ imports (late 1960s-early
1980s), the increase in forerunners’ industry legitimacy (‘Atoms for
Peace’) provided an exogenous window of opportunity for latecomers to
access forerunners’ knowledge base. In addition, with the increase in
industry legitimacy in Korea (‘Atoms for National Development and
Energy Security’), the Korean government mobilised resources, devel-
oped knowledge, and formed a market that played a critical role in the
country's becoming a ‘non-turnkey’ importer.
Second, during the period from ‘non-turnkey’ imports to technolo-
gical self-reliance (the late 1980s to the late 2000s), the decline in the
forerunner's industry legitimacy provided a critical exogenous window
Table 3
Summary of findings.
1st Evolution (from ‘Turnkey’ to ‘Non-
Turnkey’ importer)
2nd Evolution (from ‘Non-Turnkey’ importer to
technological self-reliance)
3rd Evolution (from technological self-
reliance to the global exporter)
Exogenous Windows of
Opportunity
Changes in Forerunner's Industry
Legitimacy:
▪ Increase (+) ▪ Decrease (-)
- Atoms for Peace - Safety concerns derived from two critical
accidents (Three Mile Island and Chernobyl) and
transnational anti-nuclear movement
- Lack of economic feasibility due to efficient
gas-fired power plants
Endogenous Windows of
Opportunity for Latecomer's
Industry Formation
Creation of Legitimacy ▪ Increase (+) ▪ Increase (+) ▪ Decrease (-)
- Atoms for National Development - Self-reliance on NSSS design technology and
political interference from U.S.
- Influenced by the transnational anti-
nuclear movement
- National and Energy security - Social conflict in selecting low and
intermediate level radioactive waste (LILW)
storage sites derived from policy failure
Resource Mobilization ▪ Included NPP construction in the
‘Second Five-year Economic Development
Plan’ (1967-1971)
▪ Organized EPGCC arranged by Ministry of
Energy and Resources (1985) and suggested
‘standardisation’ of NPPs
▪ Established KNEF (1992) and
implemented a government's budget for
enhancing the legitimacy of nuclear power
industry (not successful)
▪ Established Ministry of Energy and
Resources for the nuclear power industrial
policy (1977)
▪ Government R&D for developing KSNP, OPR
1000, and APR 1400
▪ Provision of attractive project financing
and military assistance from government
▪ KEPCO's investment in NSSS design verification ▪ Support the development of education and
training programs for UAE national talent
▪ Korean government decided to cover 70%
of NPP construction expense in KEDO
project for enhancing the legitimacy of
nuclear power industry (not successful)
Knowledge Development ▪ Acquire U.S. technology: Westinghouse Acquire core technology of U.S.: Combustion
Engineering
▪ Increase in localization rate in NPPs Develop an original NSSS technology: KSNP and
OPR 1000 in the late 1990s
- Enhanced from 8-13% (Turnkey
import) to 29-40% (Non-Turnkey imports)
Increase in the localisation rate of NPPs
▪ Established industrial alliance and
academic society
- Enhanced from 75% (KSNP) to 100% (APR
1400)
- Korean Nuclear Society (1969)
- Korean atomic industry forum (1972)
Market Formation ▪ Construction of the first NPP: Kori 1
(1972)
▪ Construction of two NPPs with a compulsory
technology transfer condition: Hanbit 3 and 4
(1990)
▪ Efforts to develop foreign market
▪ Construction of the six NPPs after the
first oil shock (1973): Kori 2 and Wolsong
1 (1978), Kori 3 and 4 (1980), Hanbit 1
and 2 (1981)
▪ Simultaneous construction of ten NPPs to
achieve technological self-reliance (KSNP, OPR
1000, improved OPR 1000), so called
‘standardisation of NPPs: Hanul 3 and 4 (1993),
Hanbit 5 and 6 (1997), Hanul 5 and 6 (2000),
Shin-Kori 1 and 2 (2007), and Shin-Wolsong 1 and
2 (2008)
▪ Simultaneous construction of the six
NPPs for Non-Turnkey imports: Kori 3 and
4 (1980), Hanbit 1 and 2 (1981), and
Hanul 1 and 2 (1983)
Entrepreneurial Experimentation ▪ Entry from local entrepreneurial firms in
civil engineering (construction) and
equipment manufacturing
▪ KAERI's efforts for the learning of CE's NSSS
technology
▪ Utilize the experience in KEDO project as
the prime contractor (for NPP construction
under a turnkey contract)
▪ Co-established Korea Nuclear
Engineering to enhance capability for
architectural engineering (1976)
▪ Develop a completely indigenous NSSS
technology: APR 1400
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for Korea to acquire core technology from forerunners in a transna-
tional context. Also, domestically increased legitimacy for becoming
technologically self-reliant enabled key actors to endogenise windows
of opportunity through market formation and resource mobilisation by
the Korean government. KAERI and KEPCO also contributed to en-
dogenising windows of opportunity through knowledge development,
resource mobilisation, and entrepreneurial experimentation. As a re-
sult, Korea became technologically self-reliant in 1000 MWe NPP
(KSNP and OPR 1000) and further mobilised substantial resources to
develop a completely indigenous NPP with 1400 MWe (APR 1400) as
an entrepreneurial experimentation.
Interestingly, in the third phase of being a global exporter (since
2010), the decrease in domestic legitimacy of the nuclear power in-
dustry that originated in the forerunner's anti-nuclear movement and
the policy failure of the Korean government in selecting radioactive
waste disposal sites led Korea to seek opportunities overseas. With the
increase in the legitimacy of the industry in emerging countries, re-
source mobilisation by the Korean government (project financing terms
and military assistance) and the Korean key actors’ advanced techno-
logical capability (reputation in the Middle East, education and colla-
borative research programmes, and previous entrepreneurial activities
in KEDO) contributed to KEPCO's winning of turnkey contracts for
constructing four NPPs in the UAE.
6. Discussion and conclusion
6.1. Theoretical contributions and implications
Prior catch-up studies focused on either exogenous or endogenous
windows of opportunity (Lee and Ki, 2017; Vértesy, 2017; Yap and
Truffer, 2019). We advance these studies by explaining that whereas
exogenous windows of opportunity for latecomers stem from the
changes in a forerunner's legitimacy in a transnational context, en-
dogenous windows of opportunity are exploited by latecomers in their
domestic context. By distinguishing between exogenous and en-
dogenous windows of opportunity (Lee and Malerba, 2017; Miao et al.,
2018) and proposing a framework to develop a more comprehensive
explanation, this study makes several theoretical contributions.
First, it advances our understanding of the new drivers of exogenous
windows of opportunity by considering changes in the forerunner's
industry legitimacy. While previous studies on the rise of latecomers
focused on the economic aspect of institutional forces (e.g., import
duties, R&D subsidies, technology standardization and adoption), our
analysis shows that the sociological perspective of institutional impacts
(i.e. legitimacy) is also an important element for latecomers to grow in
a challenging environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; O'Kane et al.,
2015; Scott, 2001). Moreover, whereas the legitimacy of organisations
has received much attention in the literature (Deephouse and
Suchman, 2008), we extend these studies by investigating legitimacy at
the level of a specific technological field in an industry (Aldrich and
Fiol, 1994; Bergek et al., 2008; Geels and Verhees, 2011; Zhang and
White, 2016).
Second, combining insights from catch-up theory (Lee and
Malerba, 2017) and the TIS framework (Bergek et al., 2008; Binz et al.,
2014; Hekkert et al., 2007; Yap and Truffer, 2019), we show how actors
in a latecomer context can strategically take advantage of the six core
system functions for endogenisation of windows of opportunity and
successful industry formation. Whereas prior studies on CoPS focused
on the role of government in engineering policies to support technology
development (Kiamehr et al., 2013; Naghizadeh et al., 2017;
Park, 2012), our analysis provides a systemic perspective on industry
formation not considered in conventional studies on latecomers’ CoPS
(Safdari Ranjbar et al., 2018; Yap and Truffer, 2019). Therefore, we
contribute to understanding of the interplay between government and
key actors in the industry in endogenising windows of opportunity.
Lastly, prior studies on latecomers’ CoPS focus on specific points in
time, such as the entry stage or the maturity stage, when latecomers
penetrate foreign markets (Kiamehr et al., 2015; Vértesy, 2017). As a
result, we lack understanding the challenges and remedies of lateco-
mer's catch-up in each stage (e.g. turnkey importer, self-reliant pro-
ducer, and exporter) (Lee and Yoon, 2015; Miao et al., 2018). As part of
determining a holistic process of latecomer catch-up, our analysis
documents the trajectory from a latecomer's inception to the point
when the latecomer becomes an indigenous developer and exports a
turnkey CoPS. In sum, we advance understanding of latecomers’ tech-
nological advancement trajectory over time by considering the combi-
nation of changes in a forerunner's industry legitimacy and a lateco-
mer's efforts to endogenise windows of opportunity.
6.2. Practical implications
We also provide valuable implications for policy makers and man-
agers in latecomers’ CoPS industry. It is important to recognise the
changes in a forerunner's industry legitimacy and to understand the
implications on latecomers’ access to an external knowledge base. In
addition, consistent with prior studies on industrial development po-
licies in East Asia, particularly for CoPS, our findings show that CoPS
were primarily led by governments especially during the inception
period (Lee and Ki, 2017; Lee and Yoon, 2015; Park, 2012). More im-
portantly, we emphasise that the government can act as an orchestrator
to foster interplay between key actors in the successful formation of an
industry. During the period of developing new industries and rapidly
catching up, some East Asian countries were governed under a dicta-
torship (e.g. South Korea) or even had a communist government (e.g.
China) (Hahm and Plein, 1995; Kim, 2004; Motohashi and Yun, 2007),
so government leadership in industry formation is only to be expected.
Although our analysis shows that government played a key role in
industry formation and its subsequent development, countries with
different institutional settings may adopt a different approach in which
such industry information is led by entrepreneurs, interest groups, and
professional communities (Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007;
Wirth et al., 2013). In fact, our analysis partially confirms this view by
showing the significant role played by key industrial actors in devel-
oping foreign business opportunities (i.e. the UAE) that correspond to
the substantial decrease in Korea's nuclear power industry legitimacy.
In particular, it is important to note the difficulties in addressing such a
legitimacy crisis by relying solely on government efforts
(Suchman, 1995). In fact, the majority of Korea's industry legitimacy
crisis originated in government failure (e.g. in selecting radioactive
waste disposal sites) (Choi et al., 2009; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; see
Table 5), but industrial actors can spontaneously work together to de-
velop business opportunities outside their home market to cope with
the legitimacy crisis in their domestic market.
6.3. Limitations and future research avenues
Naturally, our study is not without limitations. Our analysis fo-
cusing on the Korean nuclear power industry may raise issues related to
its generalisability. Nevertheless, the selection of our case is justified,
because the nuclear power industry with its power generation tech-
nology is a common case of CoPS (Davies and Brady, 1998;
Hobday, 1998; Markard and Truffer, 2006; Miller et al., 1995).
In addition, Korea is the only country in the world to start devel-
oping its nuclear power industry as a latecomer by importing ‘turnkey’
nuclear power and eventually became the sixth country in the world
(after the U.S., Russia, Canada, France, and Japan) to export nuclear
power plant construction (Hindmarsh and Priestley, 2015). In fact,
Korea became capable of not only developing and constructing the
sixth-largest fleet of nuclear reactors in the world but also constructing
four nuclear reactors in the UAE under a USD20 billion contract.
Furthermore, our findings are generalisable to other latecomers’
CoPS industry. For example, Iran's land-based gas turbine industry
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benefited from abrupt changes in forerunners’ institutional environ-
ment. As the U.S. sanctioned Iran, which limited U.S. firms’ transactions
with Iranian counterparts, European firms (e.g. Siemens and Ansaldo)
emerged as key players in transferring technology to Iran (see
Kiamehr et al., 2015; Majidpour, 2016, 2017). The sanctions also
strengthened the determination of the industry authorities in Iran to
achieve technological self-reliance (Majidpour, 2017). The Iranian
government created legitimacy in the domestic context by establishing
and supporting a state-owned enterprise (i.e. Mapna) to achieve catch-
up (Kiamehr et al., 2013; 2015).
Moreover, Korea's catch-up in mobile communication systems was
initially triggered by a forerunner's strategic decision to legitimise the
use of military-based technology for commercial purposes (Lee and
Lim, 2001; Park, 2012). As a result of this change in the forerunner's
environment and Korea's efforts to achieve technological self-reliance
via creating R&D programmes and forming a domestic market based on
technology standardisation, Korea was able to acquire core technology
from the U.S. firm Qualcomm and become a leader in the global tele-
communication market (Lee and Lim, 2001; Park, 2012).
Despite the generalisability of our findings across different countries
and industries, we encourage researchers to use our analytical approach
and framework in a wide variety of catch-up and leapfrogging contexts.
Table 4
Terms of technology transfer agreement between CE and KEPCO.
Source: Adapted from Ahn and Han (1998), Sung and Hong (1999), Hong (2016), and authors’ analysis based on interviews.
Channels Detailed terms and condition
Technological Documents ▪General documents: licensing, quality assurance, and procedures
▪Reference documents: design (CAD program), calculation notes, manuals, design drawing and specification, and
procedure
▪Delivery schedule: within 6 months after the contract
Computerised Design Code ▪Installation, verification and validation code, source programs, manuals, and QA verification documents
▪Delivery schedule: within 1 year after the contract
Patent Licensing
Job Training and Participation (Joint Design and
Development)
▪On the job training (Joint Design): co-participation in NSSS design between CE (technology donor) and KAERI
(technology recipient) in order to save time to design as well as accelerate technological learning by Korea.
-No extra cost for training engineers
-CE takes all responsibility for and guarantees the deliverables of the joint design
-Delivery schedule: within three years after the contract
▪On the job participation (Joint Development): perform NSSS design on NPP construction site with review and
consultation with CE
-Delivery schedule: During the successive NPPs construction, however, the degree of review and consultation were
much less significant
Table 5
Selection of low and medium-level radioactive waste disposal sites in Korea.
Time Line Main activity and result of endeavour
1st Endeavour (5/1986 - 3/1989) ▪Implemented consultation on the environmental analysis for candidates for LILW sites
▪Selection of the three candidate sites by the central government (Uljin, Yeongdeok, and Pohang)
▪Disclosed by National Assembly and residents staged protests of the decision: Government abandoned implementation
2nd Endeavour
(9/1990 - 6/1991)
▪Selected Anmyon Island as the sole LILW sites and formulated a plan to establish a branch of KAERI in the sites in secrecy.
▪Media disclosure followed by serious demonstrations by residents: Government announced the end of the endeavour.
3rd Endeavour
(11/1991 - 3/1993)
▪Developed a new policy in which the central government lists candidates for LILW sites at first and designate LILW site based on voluntary
hosting by the community.
▪Planned to support the hosting community based on regional cooperation activities by the central government
▪Residents of all seven potential sites staged protests: Government announced the delay of designation
4th Endeavour
(11/1993 - 6/1994)
▪Enacted the Act for Promoting the Radioactive Waste Management and for Supporting the Communities Surrounding the Sites
▪Created pro-nuclear force that supports the hosting of LILW sites and designated two communities as top priority (Uljin, Yangsan)
▪Serious demonstrations led by anti-nuclear force in the two communities: Government withdrew the endeavour.
5th Endeavour
(11/1994 - 12/1995)
▪Gulup Island with its small number of residents was selected as the sole candidate for LILW sites.
▪Found that the island is geologically unstable (active fault): Government withdrew the endeavour.
▪Changed the ministry in charge of the LILW sites from MOST to MOTIE
6th Endeavour
(6/2000 - 7/2001)
▪Utilized resident-driven petition for hosting LILW sites via pro-nuclear force
▪Failed to acquire support from local assembly and administration: The endeavour was aborted
7th Endeavour
(12/2002 - 2/2003)
▪Implemented the designation of four potential sites and the creation of pro-nuclear force in parallel.
▪All four sites opposed to the LILW: The endeavour was aborted
8th Endeavour
(6/2003 - 2/2004)
▪Implemented local administration-driven petition for hosting LILW sites
▪Governor of Buan applied for hosting of LILW sites without agreement with the local assembly.
▪As a result of local voting, 91.% of residents opposed hosting LILW: The endeavour was aborted
-Turnout Ratio (# of Voters): 72.0% (37,540)
9th Endeavour
(2004.2.−2005.11)
▪Built competition amongst local administrations while maintaining local administration-driven petition for hosting LILW sites
▪Required local assembly's agreement for petition
▪Enacted the Special Act for Hosting Community of LILW Sites
▪Implemented competitive bid amongst four communities that applied the hosting based on local voting: Kyongju was determined as the
hosting community for LILW sites
-Kyongju: 85.5% in favour with 70.8% turnout (147,636 voters)
-Gunsan: 84.4% in favour with 80.2% turnout (138,192 voters)
-Yeongdeok: 79.3% in favour with 80.2% turnout (30,107 voters)
-Pohang: 67.5% in favour with 47.7% turnout (178,586 voters)
Data Source: Dong-A Daily (2004), ’91.8% of Residents in Buan opposed to host Radioactive waste disposal sites’; Hong (2016); Korea Radioactive Waste Agency
(2018), ‘The history of low and intermediate level waste (LILW) storage sites’; MOTIE (2005), ‘Kyongju was selected as a radioactive waste disposal site with 89.5% in
favor’.
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In particular, we call for more research in the context of leapfrogging to
achieve more sustainable industrial structures. Such a transitional
context deserves further attention, as sustainable industries require
latecomer countries to consider a much broader set of strategies within
their socio-technical systems (Schot and Steinmuller, 2018; Wirth et al.,
2013; Yap and Truffer, 2019).
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